Storm Clouds Ahead for 401(k) Plans? by Pamela Perun
Court decision in LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg &
Associates, however, has clouded the legal land-
scape for 401(k) plans so recently cleared by PPA.
This case, which clarifies the rights of plan partic-
ipants to sue, threatens to thwart PPA’s effort to
entice more employers into offering plans.
A Progress Report on Automatic
401(k) Plan Features
Auto-enrollment
PPA did not invent auto-enrollment; McDonald’s
did. In 1984, it pioneered these features in its
401(k) plan, achieving a 93 percent participation
rate by 2002. But McDonald’s also found some
significant drawbacks to auto-enrollment. It was
certainly successful in creating large numbers of
accounts but too many remained small, raising
administrative costs, and too many were aban-
doned by workers when they quit.2 So, in 2002,
the company removed auto-enrollment features
from the plan covering its typically low-wage,
short-tenure workforce.
Other companies, typically large companies
with more stable workforces, did discover value
in auto-enrollment. Like McDonald’s, many com-
panies found that auto-enrollment raised partici-
pation rates significantly, often from the typical
45–50 percent rate with voluntary enrollment to
closer to 90 percent (Gutner and Rappaport 2008;
MassMutual 2008; Vanguard 2008). In addition,
while auto-enrollment appears successful among
all types of workers, its strongest impact is on
workers, such as low-wage and younger work-
ers, with traditionally low rates of participation
(Nessmith, Utkus, and Young 2007).
The trend to auto-enrollment was evident
even before passage of PPA. About 7 percent of
employers offered auto-enrollment in 2002,
some 17 percent in 2004 (30 percent for compa-
nies with more than 5,000 workers), and about 
24 percent by the end of 2007 (MetLife 2008; Wray
2007). Auto-enrollment seems to be more com-
mon in larger plans. In 2007, about 41 percent of
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In 2006, Congress acted decisively to put the
nation’s retirement saving system on a smoother
glide path to success. The Pension Protection Act
of 2006 (PPA) blessed three design innovations to
make 401(k) and other workplace saving plans
more productive.1 First, employers can sign up
workers into saving by payroll deduction (“auto-
enrollment”). Second, employers can choose 
how much, as a percentage of pay, workers will
save and can automatically increase it (“auto-
contribution”) for each year on the job. Third,
employers can invest workers’ accounts in a
designated default fund (“auto-investment”).
Workers can always choose not to save, choose a
different amount to save, or choose alternative
investment options. PPA also includes legal
protections for employers who include these
features in their plans.
These “auto-pilot” provisions were intended
to change two of the most intractable problems
facing the 401(k) plan system. The first is low
savings rates by workers, especially low- and
moderate-income workers. The automatic fea-
tures are intended to give workers a plan that
makes saving easy and rewarding by requiring
few up-front choices. The second is low plan
sponsorship rates by employers, especially small
and medium-sized employers. The hope is that
employers will be more willing to offer a plan if
it is an auto-pilot plan with less legal liability.
Are PPA’s reforms taking hold? Early results
indicate some encouraging signs nearly two
years later. Will they succeed over the long run?
Most indications are positive. A recent Supreme
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plans with 5,000 or more participants featured
auto-enrollment compared to only about 7 per-
cent of plans with fewer than 50 participants
(Wray 2007). This trend is confirmed by Fidelity
which reports that, by the end of 2006, 17 per-
cent of its mid-sized and large plans (at least
1,000 participants) had adopted auto-enrollment,
up from 10 percent in the prior year. The largest
increase occurred among its plans with 1,000–
2,499 participants, which grew from 13 percent 
of plans in 2005 to 22 percent in 2006 (Fidelity
2008).
Will PPA accelerate this trend? Initial esti-
mates from the government on the effects of
auto-pilot features are conservative. In 2005, for
example, 401(k)-type plans already held $2.4 tril-
lion in assets (Copeland 2008). The Department
of Labor projects that, by 2034, auto-pilot features
will add between $70 billion and $134 billion in
additional retirement savings (DOL 2007). The
Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the
government will spend in tax expenditures about
$500 million in 2010, rising to about $900 million
by 2016, on auto-enrollment (Joint Committee on
Taxation 2006). Analysis of the 2010 tax expendi-
ture projection suggests that it translates into
additional contributions of about $2.5 billion, or
about an additional $20 per worker (Perun and
Steuerle 2008).
It is too soon to tell but the government projec-
tions may be too pessimistic. Preliminary evidence
from consulting and investment firms suggests
employer enthusiasm for auto-enrollment.3
Schwab found that 20 percent of its plan clients
were using auto-enrollment in 2007, a fourfold
increase in two years.4 New York Life Retirement
Plan Services reports that the number of its plans
adopting auto-enrollment almost doubled (from
18 percent to 32 percent) between January 1 and
September 30, 2007, and predicts another 10 per-
cent in adopters in early 2008.5 Similarly, Diversi-
fied Investment Advisors Inc. found that, by the
end of 2006, 62 percent of its clients had imple-
mented auto-enrollment, a 7 percent increase
over the prior year, and another 33 percent were
considering it.6
Auto-contribution
Employer responses to auto-contribution fea-
tures, however, are less encouraging. PPA lets
employers set the initial default contribution,
and it appears too many employers are setting it
too low. Industry sources say the typical initial
default rate is 3 percent of pay (Fidelity 2008;
MassMutual 2008; Vanguard 2008; Wray 2007).
Vanguard reports, for example, that, while 
22 percent of its auto-enrollment plans have an
initial contribution rate greater than 3 percent,
about one-third of these plans require only a 
1 or 2 percent-of-pay contribution (Nessmith 
et al. 2007). Most experts would agree that even 
a 3 percent annual contribution rate is too low to
generate adequate income in retirement, with a
target of 9–12 percent (employee and employer
contributions combined) viewed as more realistic
(Nessmith et al. 2007).
Many workers also seem to believe the de-
fault rate is their savings target, rather than just
the initial rate. In one study, for example, deferral
rates dropped from 7 percent on average under
voluntary enrollment to about 4 percent when
auto-enrollment was adopted (MetLife 2008). A
Vanguard analysis reported a similar finding:
While plan participation increases under auto-
matic enrollment, median participant contribu-
tion rates decrease. The median contribution rate
in automatic enrollment designs is 2.9 percent,
which is 40 percent lower than the 5.0 percent
median contribution rate under voluntary
enrollment. (Nessmith et al. 2007)
The initial rate is critical because participants
often tend to stay at that rate. A prominent con-
sulting firm, Hewitt Associates, reports that most
participants in auto-pilot plans remain at the
default contribution rate.7 PPA does give employ-
ers the option to tie higher default contributions
to additional years of service. It is not yet clear
how many employers will do this. Vanguard
reports that 60 percent of its auto-enrollment
plans feature automatic increases (Vanguard
2008). Diversified Investment Advisors Inc. finds
that more employers are considering this option,
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and 30 percent of its clients had this feature in
2006 versus only 15 percent in 2005.
Auto-contribution features are a conundrum
for 401(k) plans. Intended to raise average sav-
ings rates, they have, unless carefully chosen, the
potential to lower them. In addition, because
auto-enrollment creates many more accounts, it
raises plan costs for employers that provide
matching or across-the-board contributions.8
There are some reports of employer resistance to
auto-pilot plans for this reason. Hewitt Associ-
ates has estimated that the cost of matching con-
tributions in a plan with full auto-enrollment
could increase by 20–30 percent, representing a
significant barrier to adoption to many employ-
ers.9 Further, without significant levels of em-
ployer contributions, too many accounts will
remain small, raising plan costs that reduce the
return to saving.
Choosing auto-contribution rates and in-
creases puts employers in a quandary. They must
trade off their concern over plan costs with their
concern for their workers’ retirement security.
Many employers—but not all—will accept these
additional costs because greater saving by lower-
income workers enables higher-paid workers to
contribute more in the standard 401(k) plan. On
the other hand, low contribution rates (with or
without matching contributions) mean smaller
account balances, resulting in higher plan ex-
penses. The rationale for auto-enrollment is that
it will increase the financial assets of workers for
retirement to meaningful levels. As McDonald’s
found, merely adding more accounts is not
enough. What matters is increasing assets in
accounts to sustainable levels in terms of plan
economics and retirement income adequacy.
Auto-investment
One of PPA’s major innovations was to specify
categories of default investments that minimized
the fiduciary risk to employers. An employer
who invests the accounts of participants who 
fail to choose their own investment options in
default funds that meet Department of Labor
guidelines will be shielded from liability for
investment losses. Prior to PPA, employers
tended to choose default funds emphasizing cap-
ital preservation over investment performance in
order to minimize their fiduciary exposure in the
event of a market turndown.
The choice of default funds is important for
workers as well as employers. Investment re-
turns play a critical role in maximizing retire-
ment income for savers. Research has found that
workers placed in default investment options
tend to remain there (MassMutual 2008). So sub-
stituting funds more appropriate for a long-term
investing program should help increase worker
accumulations for retirement.
Under regulations issued by the Department
of Labor in 2007, post-PPA default investments
typically must include exposure to equity invest-
ing.10 The approved funds are target-date funds,
balanced funds, and managed accounts. The 
new default options are not limited to auto-
enrollment plans and are becoming popular
among voluntary enrollment plans as well.
Vanguard reports that 75 percent of its plans
offered life-cycle funds in 2006, while 86 percent
of Fidelity plans did (Fidelity 2008; Vanguard
2008). Statistics for auto-enrollment funds are
similar. Fidelity reports that over 60 percent of
these plans use an age-based target fund as 
the default option (Fidelity 2008). Among
Vanguard’s auto-enrollment plans, about 90 per-
cent offer a default fund with 67 percent choos-
ing an age-based target fund and 22 percent a
balanced fund.
Early Conclusions
Employers—and workers—are still adjusting to
the potential of PPA’s reforms. At this early
point, auto-investment looks well on its way to
becoming a standard feature in 401(k) plans.
Default funds offer employers significant relief
from fiduciary liability, and plan advisors will
strongly urge their adoption (Cranch and Notto
2007). These funds are a popular industry
product, already widely in use in both auto-
enrollment and voluntary enrollment plans.
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The full promise of auto-enrollment, how-
ever, is inevitably tied to the success of auto-
contribution features. Adding millions of
accounts through auto-enrollment will mean
little if they remain small. Higher default initial
contribution rates and automatic increases for
longer tenure will be required to build worker
accounts substantially. For low- and moderate-
income workers, matching contributions will also
be critical to boost participation and investment
returns. Will employers be willing to invest more
in their auto-enrollment plans? That’s the ques-
tion for the future.
The Threat from LaRue
The LaRue Decision
On February 20, 2008, the Supreme Court
handed down a unanimous decision in LaRue v.
DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., that promises 
to have a significant impact on 401(k) plans.
James LaRue sued his former employer in 2005.
His complaint was that he had instructed plan
officials to change how his 401(k) account was
invested in 2001 and 2002. But, although the plan
gave LaRue the right to do this, his instructions
were never carried out. LaRue alleged that this
was a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, the
primary federal pension law, for which plan offi-
cials were liable. He asserted that this breach of
duty had cost his 401(k) plan account $150,000
and asked that his account be “made whole” 
(i.e., reimbursed).
The issue before the Supreme Court was not
whether LaRue was entitled to that $150,000 but
whether he had sued under an appropriate sec-
tion of ERISA.11 The law appeared to be settled
that he had not, under a 1985 ERISA case, Massa-
chusetts Life Ins. Co. v. Russell. Russell involved an
employer-sponsored disability plan from which a
participant sought damages for a failure by plan
fiduciaries to pay her claim promptly. The Su-
preme Court held that ERISA did not permit
claims for money damages under this section of
ERISA unless the damages were on behalf of the
“entire” plan. Individual participants could not
seek financial redress solely for their personal
benefit.
In LaRue, the Supreme Court clarified its rul-
ing in Russell. To do that, the Court first took note
of a key difference between 1985 and 2008—the
dominant role now played by 401(k)-type plans
in the private pension system. Under ERISA,
plan fiduciaries have the duty to manage, admin-
ister, and invest plan funds properly and to act in
the best interest of plan participants. The Court
recognized that plan funds are held in individual
participant accounts in 401(k)-type plans. There-
fore, an injury to an individual account is an
injury to the plan within the meaning of Russell
for which ERISA provides a remedy. As the
Court noted,
fiduciary misconduct need not threaten the
solvency of the entire plan to reduce benefits
below the amount that participants would other-
wise receive. Whether a fiduciary breach dimin-
ishes plan assets payable to all participants and
beneficiaries, or only to persons tied to particu-
lar accounts, it creates the types of harms that
concerned the draftsmen of [ERISA].
The Significance of LaRue
LaRue now returns to the lower courts where the
facts of the dispute will finally be contested.
There is no guarantee Mr. LaRue will ultimately
recover the $150,000 he seeks. But the case repre-
sents a significant turning point. This is so not
because the ruling was unexpected, as most pen-
sion attorneys believed the clear language of
ERISA compelled the result. Neither did LaRue
expand ERISA’s reach. Its significance instead is
that it puts into sharp relief the vast legal expo-
sure of employers sponsoring 401(k)-type plans
under ERISA’s regulatory framework.12
Under ERISA, someone—usually the
employer—must ensure that a plan is managed
for the benefit of participants and complies with
the law. In most plans, that entity or individual,
the “named fiduciary,” is the employer. If judged
at fault, a fiduciary can be held liable when the
plan suffers losses or doesn’t comply with the
law. A plan can have several fiduciaries perform-
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ing different functions. Generally, anyone who
has discretionary authority over any aspect of the
plan or renders investment advice for a fee is a
fiduciary and can be held liable for a breach of
duty. But named fiduciaries retain overall
responsibility for the plan. They can be held
responsible for the behavior of other fiduciaries if
they have been imprudent in appointing them or
have failed to monitor their behavior.
Why does ERISA require so much of the
employer? Because of defined benefit plans.
Thirty-five years ago when ERISA was drafted,
defined benefit plans dominated the private pen-
sion system. In the hard economic times just past,
many workers lost the retirement income they
had earned after many years of service when
some large plans failed. ERISA’s primary pur-
pose was to require employers to do more to
strengthen their defined benefit plans and to
hold them more accountable when they failed.
The law requires employers to fund plans with
sufficient assets and manage them responsibly
(or hire and monitor competent advisors) or face
financial liability when they do not. In addition,
thanks to ERISA, the government guarantees a
portion of worker benefits against plan insol-
vency through a federal insurance program.
ERISA designates employers as the focal point 
of its regulatory scheme for two major reasons:
(1) to secure the defined benefit promise for
workers and (2) to protect the government’s
interest in the financial health of these plans.
How well does ERISA’s structure fit 401(k)
plans? Not very well, as 401(k) plans have few of
the features that ERISA was drafted to protect: 
no long-term promise, no lifelong retirement
income, no government insurance, no central
pool of assets, no required employer contribu-
tions. These plans are really just investment pro-
grams, not pension plans. Workers contribute to
their own individual accounts and choose in-
vestments from a broad array of choices. Some
employers offer matching or across-the-board
contributions, often on a year-by-year basis, but
many do not. Few employers play a significant
role in plan administration. Instead, they turn to
the large industry of financial service companies,
consulting firms, record-keepers and assorted
other service providers available to perform the
complicated services that 401(k) plans require.
Many larger employers understand they are
plan fiduciaries and factor the risks of plan litiga-
tion into their employee benefits costs. But too
many employers are not even aware that they are
fiduciaries. In one study by AllianceBernstein, 
60 percent of defined contribution plan sponsors
asserted they were not fiduciaries, with about 
80 percent of sponsors in very small plans and 
62 percent of sponsors in small plans holding
that belief. Even over 50 percent of employers in
medium-sized plans and over 40 percent in 
large plans did not believe they were fiduciaries
(Gangemi and Mintzer 2006).13 It is not clear why
this is so. Some seem to believe that other service
providers fill that role. For example, whatever
the size of the plan, over one-third of employers
believed they had hired an independent fidu-
ciary service. This is almost certainly not the
case. Even if true, few employers could escape
being tagged as the “named fiduciary” for their
plans.
The AllianceBernstein study concluded that
the majority of plan sponsors do not spend ade-
quate time designing and maintaining their
plans, understanding the fees charged for ser-
vices, choosing and reviewing their investment
menus, or understanding how they could mini-
mize their legal liability. This makes them vulner-
able to the fiduciary litigation blessed by LaRue.
But LaRue is not necessarily a green light for plan
participants to head down in droves to the local
courthouse. Litigation is expensive and time con-
suming, and victory is always uncertain. Without
a significant financial loss and relatively certain
chances of recovery, few participants will find a
lawyer willing to take their case. Participants
almost never get compensated for attorneys’ fees
and, under ERISA, never get extracontractual
damages (pain and suffering). The most partici-
pants can hope for is the full benefit they would
have received but for the fiduciary breach.
Nevertheless, 401(k) plan litigation is ex-
panding. Major lawsuits are already pending
against large employers and plan service pro-
T H E  R E T I R E M E N T  P O L I C Y  P R O G R A M
6 July 2008
viders over allegations of excessive fees, im-
proper revenue-sharing arrangements, and
imprudent investment options.14 Such cases are
economically attractive to class-action lawyers
because of the large number of participants
involved. But they are not frivolous lawsuits.
These cases are important tests of ERISA princi-
ples in the defined contribution context, and pen-
sion regulators are watching carefully. The
Department of Labor, for example, recently inter-
vened in support of workers’ claims in a high-
profile case involving Fidelity Investments and
Deere & Co. over plan fees.15 In this case, the
Department of Labor is highlighting how it
believes ERISA protects 401(k) plan participants.
Because courts often give deference to the De-
partment’s interpretation of ERISA, it is likely
that participants will win some big cases soon.
What is the significance of LaRue? It’s a loud
wake-up call for employers, especially those in
the small and medium-sized plan market. Many
won’t worry about a big lawsuit over plan fees or
investment options. But being sued and having
to pay for not processing a participant’s form—a
garden variety slipup in 401(k) plans? That is all
too imaginable.
LaRue teaches employers that they are the
financial backstop for their plans. Because 401(k)
plans have no pool of unallocated assets, they
will be the deep pocket when something goes
wrong in a participant’s account. Many employ-
ers will conclude that this is not the role they
want or believe they should play in helping their
workers prepare for retirement. For others,
despite PPA’s reforms, the financial risks and
administrative burdens of sponsoring a plan will
be too great. Already, there is concern that LaRue
will reverse recent gains in plan sponsorship in
the small and medium-sized plan market.16
LaRue represents a perception problem as
much as it does a legal problem. While the case
did not change employers’ responsibilities as a
legal matter, the fact that the courthouse door is
now clearly open to plan participants has raised
employers’ concerns. Such concerns can have a
significant effect on employer behavior. For
example, employers did not really need PPA to
legitimate auto-pilot features for their plans.
They were already available, although there was
some legal ambiguity in some states about auto-
enrollment. Many employers, however, refused
to add auto-pilot features without the explicit
release from legal liability that PPA provided.
Post-LaRue, many risk-averse employers are
likely to think twice about sponsoring a plan,
even though, in reality, the likelihood of litigation
is low.
Looking beyond LaRue
The theory behind PPA was that streamlining
401(k) plans could go a long way toward getting
more workers to save and getting them to save
more. But that theory holds only if employers are
willing to sponsor plans. Assuming LaRue poses
a real threat to plan sponsorship, what might be
done to ameliorate its effects on employers with-
out jeopardizing the interests of workers? Here
are four possible courses of action:
Amend the Law to Restrict 
Participant Lawsuits
Congress could always overrule LaRue by
amending ERISA to restrict participant lawsuits
in defined contribution plans. The pros and cons
of this alternative were clearly before the Court
in LaRue. Advocates for employers argued that,
without protection from litigation, employers
would terminate their plans or cut back on bene-
fits in response to higher plan costs. Advocates
for workers argued that denying participants the
right to sue would leave them with no meaning-
ful legal recourse to protect their retirement
assets. It would also leave the trillions of dol-
lars in defined contribution plans effectively
unregulated.17
On balance, worker advocates seem to have
the better argument. Shutting the courthouse
door completely on participants would be an
extreme response to the as yet uncertain conse-
quences of LaRue. Given that a primary purpose
of ERISA is to protect plan assets for the benefit
of workers, it is difficult to imagine Congress
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becoming interested in restricting worker rights
any time soon.
Require Participants to Exhaust 
Plan Procedures before Litigation
Chief Justice Roberts suggested this alternative 
in his concurring opinion in LaRue. He invited
lower courts to consider whether LaRue-type
claims should be subject to plan appeal proce-
dures under an alternative section of ERISA prior
to litigation. ERISA requires claims for benefits 
to be initially submitted for resolution to plan
administrators. This procedure gives employers
an advantage. Under a prior Supreme Court
decision, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, if 
a plan gives the plan administrator the discre-
tion to resolve claims for benefits, a court will 
not later overturn an adverse decision unless 
the administrator’s ruling was arbitrary and
capricious.
This might be a compromise alternative. It
provides a forum for participant grievances with-
out the expense of full-blown litigation. On the
other hand, the plan administrator is typically an
agent of the employer, even though charged as a
fiduciary to act solely in the best interests of plan
participants. A just-issued Supreme Court deci-
sion, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Glenn,
considered how to address the issue of conflicts
of interest in benefit-claim decisions. The Court
acknowledged that a plan administrator’s dual
role of both paying and evaluating claims creates
a conflict of interest. It did not change the Fire-
stone standard but it did hold that courts re-
viewing benefit-claim denials should consider
conflicts of interest when evaluating a plan
administrator’s decision. In some respects, this
case is a win for employers. It did not restrict
their discretion to decide claims for benefits. But
it is almost certain that going forward, every
plaintiff will raise the conflict of interest issue in
litigation, and many employers may find it diffi-
cult to defend themselves.
On balance, requiring plan participants to
jump the benefit-claim hurdle does not seem fair.
Given the inherent conflicts of interest present in
these procedures, it seems unreasonable to ask an
employer to sit in judgment on its own behavior
as a fiduciary. Plan participants should have
some due process rights to a fair procedure with
an independent fact finder. That leaves the courts
as a first, not a last, resort.
Reduce Fiduciary Litigation through
Employer Education and Assistance
Since LaRue, plan advisors have been actively
counseling their clients on steps they could take
to minimize the threat of litigation. Those include
auditing their plan procedures to reduce the risk
of errors, updating their fiduciary insurance cov-
erage, reviewing contracts with service providers
to ensure fiduciary roles are clear, and revising
plan documents to minimize fiduciary exposure
wherever possible.18 This is fine advice, likely to
be followed by the large employers who employ
benefits advisors. But it probably won’t reach
employers the most in need of it—those who
don’t understand what their fiduciary duties are
and even that they are fiduciaries.
A variation on this theme is to assist employ-
ers with their fiduciary decisions by requiring
more disclosure from service providers. The
theory here is many employers are placed in
legal jeopardy because they don’t have the infor-
mation necessary to make the informed decisions
required of fiduciaries. Currently under discus-
sion in Congress is H.R. 3185, the “401(k) Fair
Disclosure Act for Retirement Security Act of
2008.” Among other things, this bill would re-
quire service providers to furnish plan adminis-
trators with detailed information about services
to be performed and their costs, including any
revenue-sharing arrangements. It also requires
plan administrators to provide participants with
more information about the available investment
options and their cost structure. The bill imposes
financial penalties on service providers and plan
administrators who fail to comply. In addition,
the Department of Labor has been active on this
issue by proposing new regulations to require
service providers to disclose more information
about their fees and potential conflicts of inter-
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ests. The Department also intends to give em-
ployers some relief from fiduciary liability when
service providers fail to meet their disclosure
obligations.19
These requirements will certainly be helpful
in clarifying a murky area in 401(k) plan manage-
ment: (1) the fees charged by service providers
and (2) the relationships among service providers
and their relationship to the fees charged. Many
employers, particularly large employers, will
accept and perhaps even welcome them. But the
AllianceBernstein study revealed that many
employers are disengaged from their plans. Will
this information help them perform their fidu-
ciary responsibilities better? Or will it persuade
them that sponsoring a plan is too much work
for too little reward?
Relieve Employers of Named 
Fiduciary Status Where Appropriate
PPA brought some fiduciary relief to employers,
but it did not significantly reconfigure their role.
Legally speaking, employers are the focal point
in defined contribution plans just as in defined
benefit plans. But, functionally speaking, em-
ployer involvement in the management of these
plans is poles apart. So why do we hold them
both to the same fiduciary standard?
Few employers are qualified for or interested
in running an investment program for their
employees. So, in order to make a 401(k) plan
available, an employer must buy it from a ven-
dor much like any other product an employer
buys. The financial services industry has made
this possible by selling off-the-shelf 401(k) plans
with a bundled package of service providers. For
this market, it seems unreasonable to hold an
employer ultimately responsible as a named
fiduciary for a product and services it did not
and could not select by itself.
Releasing the employer from its obligations
as a named fiduciary in a packaged 401(k) plan
leaves other fiduciary protections still in place.
ERISA already contains a comprehensive regula-
tory system for fiduciaries that calibrates legal
liabilities with functional responsibilities. In this
system, (1) anyone who has discretion over plan
funds is a fiduciary, and (2) a plan must have a
named fiduciary overseeing all the other fiducia-
ries. Without the employer as the named fidu-
ciary, financial services companies making
discretionary decisions about plan investments
and consulting firms providing discretionary
plan services would still be liable under current
rules when they breach their duties. Employers
would retain all other responsibilities such as to
transfer participant contributions to the plan on a
timely basis and to ensure the plan qualifies for
special tax benefits. But they could no longer be
held responsible for the actions of other fiducia-
ries they have no ability to supervise.
The notion that employers should be the ulti-
mate responsible parties is deeply embedded in
ERISA, and resistance to changing it will be
strong. Practically speaking, however, partici-
pants and their accounts would be protected just
as they are today while employers would be pro-
tected from inadvertently becoming the deep
pocket for their plans. Experience with IRAs sug-
gests this change is indeed feasible. Accounts in
401(k) plans are really just individual retirement
accounts under a plan umbrella. IRAs do not
have the overlay of ERISA fiduciary rules and an
employer as an intermediary, but they are largely
scandal free. It is time to ask which ERISA pro-
tections in the defined contribution plan context
are counterproductive because they deter em-
ployers from sponsoring plans.
This modest first step toward rationalizing
ERISA could accomplish something critical to the
success of 401(k) plans—aligning the interests of
employers and workers. What LaRue illustrates is
how ERISA today turns employers and workers
into adversaries. What is needed instead is em-
ployers to be on the side of workers when things
go wrong, not to be caught in the middle.
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